Much work has considered the evolution of pathogens, but little is known about 2 how they respond to changes in host behaviour. We build a model where hosts are 3 able to choose to engage in prophylactic measures that reduce the likelihood of disease 4 transmission. This choice is mediated by costs and benefits associated with prophylaxis, 5 but the fraction of hosts engaged in prophylaxis is also affected by population dynamics. 6 We identify a critical cost threshold above which hosts do not engage in prophylaxis.
Note that the differential equations in (1) sum to zero, and so total population size N is 75 constant. This, along with the fact that group membership among recovered individuals is 76 of no consequence, allows us to omit (1e) and (1f). We now use u i = S i /N and v i = I i /N to 77 denote the fraction of susceptible and infective individuals, respectively, in group i. Similarly, 78 we use u = u 0 + u 1 and v = v 0 + v 1 to denote the total fraction of susceptible and infective 79 individuals, respectively. The dynamics of u and v can then be modelled by the following 80 set of differential equations: 
We also track the fraction of susceptible and infected individuals taking protective mea- dynamics can now be stated as, 
where R 0 = β 00 /(1 + γ) is the basic reproductive number [9] of the system in the absence β ij . To reflect this, we now write β ij (ξ) where
In words, we are treating β ij as an increasing function of ξ that saturates at a value of 139 β max (1 − ε) i+j , where ε is the probability that the prophylactic measures prevent disease 140 transmission. We assume that prophylactic measures taken by individuals fail independently, 141 so (1 − ε) 2 gives the probability that the disease is transmitted between two individuals 142 engaging in prophylaxis. The rate at which transmission saturates is controlled by κ > 0,
143
with larger values of this constant corresponding to a reduced rate of saturation.
144
Exploitation also affects recovery. To reflect this assumption, we write γ(ξ), where γ(ξ) = 145 cξ for a constant c with units of inverse time (the exploitation level ξ is dimensionless).
146
Without loss of generality, we take c = 1. Here, increased exploitation acts to reduce the 147 expected duration 1/(1 + γ(ξ)) of an infection. This penalty of larger ξ, then, trades off 148 against the transmissibility benefits described above. Previous authors have either assumed 149 (or shown) that such trade-offs exist, though they are often mediated by disease-related 150 mortality [7, 23, 24] or viral load [25] . Here, we followÚbeda and Jansen [26] and Alizon
151
[27] by assuming the trade-off faced by the pathogen involves recovery, e.g., through increased 152 viral load making it more likely that the pathogen is detected by the host's immune system.
153
We use an adaptive dynamics approach to model the evolution of pathogen exploitation 154 under the primary influence of natural selection [8, 28, 26] . We introduce a rare mutant 155 pathogen with exploitation trait ξ m into a resident pathogen population with exploitation 156 trait ξ. It is assumed that the resident system has reached equilibrium prior to introducing
As we do with the resident population, we can also track the proportion of individuals 162 infected with the mutant strain engaging in prophylaxis. Denoting this proportion by y m ,
163
we can describe its dynamics by
If the mutant strain becomes common, the approximate dynamics in (8) break down and we 165 say that the mutant has successfully invaded the resident population. Provided the system 166 is sufficiently close to an evolutionarily steady state, a mutant who successfully invades will 167 become the new resident [29] .
168
Since v m does not appear in (8b), we can first solve for the equilibrium valueȳ m of 169 y m , substitute that value into (8a), and study (8a) alone. If the right-hand side of (8a) is 170 positive (resp. negative), the mutant invades (resp. is eliminated) because it is favoured 171 (resp. disfavoured) by natural selection. The sign of the right-hand side of (8a) is the same 172 as the sign of the difference between
and unity, where
represents an average transmission rate taking into account the different groups of susceptible and infective individuals. W then has a clear biological interpretation, made in previous 176 work [8] , in terms of the basic reproductive number of the mutant strain. In particular, an 177 infection with the mutant strain lasts an average of 1/(1 + γ) time units and an average of 178 β avgū new infections are created during this time. If this quantity is larger than one (resp. 179 smaller than one), then the mutant population will grow (resp. shrink). Writing W as we 180 have done in equation (9) also highlights the two trade-offs faced by the pathogen. One is 181 the transmission-recovery trade-off described above, captured through the β avg and γ terms.
182
By unpacking the β avg term, though, we can also see a second trade-off between the type of 183 infection created. Through theȳ m terms, the pathogen is able to influence whether a new 184 infection occurs in a protector or a non-protector. We can, therefore, use W as a payoff 185 function in the adaptive dynamics analysis.
186
Following the discussion above, the direction of evolution of ξ that is favoured by natural 187 selection is given by the sign of ∂W/∂ξ m | ξm=ξ . Consequently, the selective process is at 188 equilibrium whenever ξ =ξ whereξ satisfies 189 ∂W ∂ξ m ξm=ξ=ξ = 0.
An equilibrium valueξ, i.e., one that satisfies condition (10) There are two special cases that can be analyzed with relative ease. The first special case 200 assumes the cost of prophylaxis exceeds the threshold χ c . In this case, no one in a population 201 supporting the resident endemic disease is adopting prophylactic measures and sox =ȳ = 0.
202
Given the absence of protectors, we find two equilibrium values of y m : a stable pointȳ m = 0 203 and an unstable pointȳ m = (ūβ 00 + (χ − χ c )χ)/(ū(β 00 − β 01 )). This, in turn, reduces the 204 payoff function to
The mutant strain is then able to invade (resp. is eliminated) if W (ξ m , ξ) exceeds (resp. is 206 less than) unity; equivalently, if R 0 (ξ m ) exceeds or is less than R 0 (ξ). More importantly, 207 the CSS level of exploitation,ξ, will maximize R 0 (ξ) and soξ = √ κ. This will serve as a 208 benchmark against which more general results will be compared.
209
The second special case assumes that prophylactic measures are cost-free, i.e., χ = 0.
210
Under this assumption, the distribution of the mutant strain, captured byȳ m , does not 211 depend on the mutant exploitation level and so the trade-off in the type of infection created 212 is no longer applicable. In this case, the payoff function simplifies substantially and analysis 213 shows thatξ = √ κ is the CSS. This is the same result as the benchmark established in our 214 first special case, despite the presence of individuals engaging in prophylaxis. Absence of
(b) Evolution Near the Critical Cost
In general, the model cannot be explored analytically. However, if we are near the critical 219 cost χ c we can derive quasi-analytic results. When the cost χ is slightly below its critical 220 threshold χ c , we can approximate the CSS exploitation level asξ
If σ is positive (resp. negative), thenξ is above (resp. below) the benchmark value of √ κ. As 223 equation (14) shows, whether we are above or below this benchmark depends on how small 224 changes in cost lead to small changes in the proportion of susceptible protectors which, in 225 turn, lead to changes in the selection gradient acting on exploitation. 226 We can show with a quasi-analytic approach that equation (14) is always negative. Our 227 evidence relies on first choosing feasible values of our parameters. In particular, we need
that χ c > 0. To ensure that ε < 1, we then need to choose k > 1 R 0 −1 .
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Using feasible parameters and working to zeroth order in χ − χ c , we use the computer 231 algebra software (CAS) Maple (version 2019.1) to investigate the sign of σ as described in 232 equation (14). We find that the requirement that R 0 > 1 necessarily restricts our choices of 233 maximal transmissibility, β max , to values that lie above the curve traced out by (1 + √ κ) 2 234 (figure 1, panel A). The CAS shows that nullclines of (14) (14) and panel B shows that these all occur on or below the black and dashed grey curves (note that vertical dotted grey lines are an artifact of jump discontinuities). Choosing parameter values in the region above the curves in panel A results in the right-hand side of equation (14) being negative, as noted in panel B. The implication is that the pathogen exploitation level (virulence) will decrease relative to the benchmark level of √ κ close to the cost threshold χ c .
Our results can be extended numerically for costs that are possibly much smaller than the 242 critical value, χ c , using a Matlab (version R2019a) procedure detailed in Appendix D. We 243 build the procedure around the observation that locally asymptotically stable equilibrium 244 solutions to dξ/dt = (∂W/∂ξ m )| ξm=ξ are also convergence-stable evolutionary equilibria as 245 defined by conditions (10) and (11), respectively. As a result, numerical iteration of this 246 differential equation can be used to find candidate CSS strategies. The evolutionary stability 247 of candidate CSS strategies can be confirmed with a centred finite-difference approximation 248 of (12). Since the error is on the order of the square of the distance between ξ values used 249 in the approximation, we consider any value within this error to satisfy the ESS condition.
250
The results of our numerical procedure confirm that the benchmark CSS level ofξ = √ κ 251 is obtained when χ = 0 and χ = χ c . Second, numerical results confirm the reduction in 252 the CSS level of pathogen exploitation for χ slightly smaller than χ c . Third, and most 253 important, numerical results indicate that the CSS exploitation rateξ changes in a simple 254 way as cost is reduced from its critical value to its natural lower limit at zero (figure 2). In recall that one time unit is equivalent to the average lifetime of an individual in the popu-They show that host prophylactic behaviour in response to an endemic disease can allow the 294 invasion of a pathogen strain that is more virulent than the resident. Our model predicts that 295 such an outcome cannot occur as a result of the fact that our benchmark result, established 296 in the absence of prophylactic behaviour, is our worst case scenario. Consider a mutant 297 pathogen with a virulence ξ > √ κ. When the cost is above its critical value so that no one 298 is engaging in prophylaxis, then this mutant cannot invade a resident population at the CSS 299ξ = √ κ. If we then decrease the cost below its critical value so that individuals begin to 300 take prophylactic measures, the CSS exploitation level decreases away fromξ = √ κ and so 301 the mutant is still unable to invade the resident population.
302
The discrepancy between our prediction and those of Pharaon and Bauch is due to the 
308
These key differences are missing from previous work [16] and lead us to the conclusion that, 309 for all feasible sets of parameter values, we expect a decrease in pathogen exploitation away 310 from the benchmark value found in the absence of prophylactic behaviour.
311
To get some intuition into the decrease in virulence associated with protective host be-312 haviour, we first recall the two tradeoffs faced by a pathogen in our model. Since the fitness 313 function (9) is the product of the average duration of infection and the rate of production of 314 new infections, changing virulence alters the balance between these two quantities. influence the hosts' economic agency.
330
As the cost of prophylaxis is reduced, the frequency with which mutant new infections 331 are found in one kind of host or another becomes less dependent on virulence. Eventually, 332 this frequency becomes totally decoupled from virulence when the cost is zero. For lower 333 cost, then, the pathogen is only weakly able to influence the type of new infections it creates.
334
Instead, it must fall back on influencing the trade-off between duration of infection and rate of 335 production of new infections. This more classical trade-off has been studied in previous work, 336 e.g., [8] , and the standard prediction is that natural selection will push for increased virulence 337 to decrease the duration of infection and maintain balance with a slowing transmission rate.
338
As the cost of prophylaxis is decreased and the trade-off between duration of infection and 339 rate of production of new infections becomes dominant, this standard result then explains 340 the increasing virulence seen in our model. In this way, our results also contribute to the 341 larger body of research looking at pathogen trade-offs by incorporating this nested trade-off 342 where the pathogen is able to influence the type of infection created in addition to the more 343 classical trade-off between transmission and recovery [27, 26] .
344
As with any modelling endeavour, we have made some simplifying assumptions to reduce 345 the mathematical complexity of our model. For example, we have assumed that individuals 346 instantly update their behaviour when receiving new information about the progression of 347 the disease. In reality, there is a time delay between receiving information and deciding to modify behaviour. Previous work has studied the effects of including a delay in the form 349 of waning immunity either independently [39] or together with a delay in the form of a 350 latent period following infection [40] , and found that this can create periodicity in the model Moreover, the pathogen's virulence is always below the level predicted in the absence of in-370 dividuals engaging in prophylactic behaviour. There is a balance, then, between the level of 371 cost that is optimal for minimizing prevalence and the level optimal for minimizing pathogen 372 virulence. It is important to recognize that efforts to minimize the cost of prophylaxis will 373 result in a pathogen strain that is more virulent than it otherwise might be. More broadly, 374 our work suggests that conversations about disease management and infection should be more inclusive towards the effects of human behaviour.
which, when evaluated at the disease-free equilibrium (DFE) (ū,v) = (1, 0), has eigenvalues 487 λ 1 = −1 and λ 2 = β 00 − 1 − γ. The DFE is stable when both eigenvalues are negative, which 488 leads us to the condition that R 0 = β 00 /(1 + γ) < 1 for stability.
489
When R 0 exceeds this threshold, the DFE becomes unstable and the standard two-490 dimensional system moves towards an endemic equilibrium (ū,v) = (1/R 0 , (1 − 1/R 0 )/(1 + 491 γ)). To determine the region in which this equilibrium remains stable after we incorporate the 492 host behavioural dynamics, we need to consider the Jacobian matrix of our four-dimensional 493 system (5) evaluated at (ū,v,x,ȳ) 
where χ c = R 0 − k+1 k β 10 β 00 (R 0 − 1) + 1 and asterisks denote entries that are possibly non-describing the evolutionary dynamics of pathogen exploitation as the scalar-valued func-508 tion G(r, s; χ). We know that below the critical cost threshold χ c the endemic equilibrium 509 (r,ŝ) = (û,v,x,ŷ,ξ) is stable, while above this threshold our system tends towards the 510 protector-free equilibrium (r,s) = (ū,v, 0, 0,ξ). The critical cost level represents a bifur-511 cation point where these two equilibria coincide and undergo an exchange of stability. To 512 study how our system reacts as we decrease the cost away from this threshold, we intro-513 duce a perturbation parameter δ = χ − χ c and take a first-order approximation to our new 514 equilibrium point (r,ŝ) = (ū + ρ 1 δ,v + ρ 2 δ, ρ 3 δ, ρ 4 δ,ξ + σδ). Knowing that this equilibrium 515 point must satisfy F(r,ŝ; χ) = 0 and G(r,ŝ; χ) = 0, our goal is to find expressions for the 516 perturbation coefficients ρ 1 , ρ 2 , ρ 3 , ρ 4 , and σ.
517
If we treat (r,ŝ) as a function of χ, we can make a first-order Taylor series approximation 
where subscripts denote partial derivatives and dr = (ρ 1 , ρ 2 , ρ 3 , ρ 4 ) and dŝ = σ are the 520 derivatives with respect to χ ofr andŝ, respectively. We know that (r,s) is an equilibrium 521 point, so the first term in equations (17a) and (17b) evaluates to zero. We also observe that 522 every term in F and G involving χ is multiplied by at least one of x or y, and so the partial 523 derivatives with respect to χ vanish when we evaluate at (r,s). This simplifies (17) 
We can write (18) more succinctly as J [ dr dŝ ] = 0 where the matrix J has the following 525 structure:
with asterisks denoting entries that are possibly non-zero. Since J is a block triangular 527 matrix, the eigenvalues are given by the eigenvalues of the matrices on the main diagonal.
528
The 2 × 2 matrix in the upper left is the Jacobian matrix arising from the linearization of the 529 standard SIR model around the protector-free endemic equilibrium. Since the lower-right 530 3 × 3 block is lower triangular and has a zero entry on its main diagonal, we can see that zero 531 is an eigenvalue of J. This allows us to interpret [ dr dŝ ] as the eigenvector of J associated with 532 the zero eigenvalue, and so shows that there is a non-trivial solution for our perturbation 533 coefficients.
534
While an analytic expression for this eigenvector can be found, it is unwieldy. Of more 535 interest is the sign of the perturbation coefficient σ, as this tells us in which directionξ 536 moves as we decrease the cost below its critical value. The third row of (19) 
We know that the denominator of (20) is always negative sinceξ = √ κ is convergence stable 541 (see (11)), and we know that ρ 3 > 0 since the proportion of susceptible protectors increases as 542 the cost is decreased below its critical value. It follows, then, that the sign of σ is controlled 543 only by the numerator of (20) and so we arrive at equation (14) 
